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any observers have suggested that banks ad-
just their administered rates asymmetrically,
raising loan rates more readily than they lower them.
Empirical studies have found support for this claim:
Depository institutions appear to move faster to lower
deposit rates than to raise them (Neumark and Sharpe,
1992; Diebold and Sharpe, 1990; Hutchison,1995).
Such asymmetries, if they exist in the banking system,
are of interest to monetary policymakers because
they would support Cover’s (1992) argument that
monetary policy changes are propagated asymmetri-
cally, with monetary policy tightenings carrying more
force than easings of the same magnitude.  In addi-
tion, because asymmetry in loan interest rates tilted
toward slow downward adjustment works to the dis-
advantage of loan customers, bank-dependent ﬁrms as
a group are thought to be more vulnerable to the busi-
ness cycle than ﬁrms with direct access to capital
markets.  Interest rates move in a highly procyclical
manner, so that if loan rates are sluggish when mov-
ing down, relative to market interest rates, then ﬁrms
that rely on bank loans will be paying relatively high
rates during cyclical downturns, precisely at the time
when sales revenues tend to be low.  This article tests
for the existence of an asymmetric relation between
the prime rate and market interest rates and examines
whether the effects of such asymmetry are of sufﬁ-
cient magnitude and duration to be of concern.
The focus of this article is the bank prime rate,
a posted lending rate that ostensibly represents the
rate banks offer to their most creditworthy borrowers.
It is worth noting that numerous borrowers are able
to get loans at less than the prime rate—especially
on short-term loans—but, more importantly, many
loan rates are tied to the prime, changing by an equal
amount whenever the prime rate changes.  Because
a variety of loan rates—including many credit card
balances—are tied contractually to the prime rate,
it is an important benchmark.  This article reviews
how risk aversion on the part of bank managers
could lead to asymmetric movement in bank lending
rates, such as the prime.  Risk aversion, in this con-
text, simply means that managers prefer a smooth
proﬁt stream to a volatile one. 
The article’s main contribution, however, lies
in the empirical methodology used to test for asym-
metry in the response of the prime rate to short-
term market interest rates. The prime rate changes
discretely by multiples of 25 basis points, which
implies that changes are relatively infrequent (less
than 20 percent of all weeks) and, therefore, news-
worthy.  Discreteness can confound tests for sym-
metry, that is, tests for equal responsiveness to
pressure to increase or decrease.  The pressure to
respond to movements in market interest rates does
not appear suddenly only in weeks when the prime
rate actually changes, so one must ﬁnd a way to
measure how the continuous pressure translates
into occasional discrete changes.  Empirical analysis
of the historical data on the prime rate is hampered
because econometric models provide methods for
dealing with discrete-valued data and methods for
analyzing time-series data, but rarely present methods
for confronting the two together.  
This article addresses the disparate features of
the data by employing a dynamic ordered probit
model of changes in the prime rate to test for two
types of possible asymmetry in the prime.  First,
the model includes estimated thresholds at which
money-center banks change the prevailing prime
rate.  The thresholds indicate the degree of misalign-
ment between the prime rate and market interest
rates needed to induce a discrete change in the prime
rate.  Second, I estimate separate coefﬁcients for
increases and decreases in the short-term interest
rate.  The difference between these sets of coefﬁ-
cients measures any asymmetry in the generation
of underlying pressure for a prime rate change,
whereas differences among the threshold coefﬁ-
cients reﬂect an asymmetry in how such pressure
is translated into discrete prime rate changes.
WHY STUDY THE PRIME RATE?
The prime rate, not a deposit rate, is the focus
in this article because the prevailing prime rate is
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much more uniform across banks than any measure
of the prevailing deposit rate.  Aggregate data for
deposit rates represent an average of different rates
across many banks, and such an average does not
fully reﬂect the asymmetry that a customer might
experience at a single bank.  Moreover, if one were
to follow the movement of a deposit rate at a single
bank, its degree of asymmetry might not be repre-
sentative of conditions in the whole banking system.
In contrast, the prevailing prime rate among money-
center banks is a ﬁgure widely quoted in the ﬁnan-
cial press, and it is generally the same across banks.
Reason to Expect Asymmetric Behavior
in the Prime Rate
The idea that signiﬁcant costs to customers of
switching suppliers can alter the nature of compe-
tition among suppliers has found applications in
industrial organization, macroeconomics, and inter-
national trade (Klemperer, 1995).  A key implication
is that switching costs make sellers imperfect com-
petitors.  An important example where switching
costs are thought to pertain is the relationship be-
tween banks and their loan customers.  Here I out-
line why switching costs, combined with risk-averse
bank management, might lead to asymmetric move-
ment in the pricing of bank loans.  
Banks specialize in acquiring costly information
about their business loan customers.  Consequently,
borrowers ﬁnd it costly to switch from a lender who
knows them to one who does not.  Once a relation-
ship is established, one might conclude that a bank
could extract monopoly rents from its customers in
the form of above-normal interest rates.  Rajan (1992)
argues that such opportunistic behavior may not ﬁt
into a bank’s optimal long-run strategy, because
rival banks could capture its customers by sharing
the switching costs. Gilbert and Klemperer (2000)
discuss ways in which competition among sellers
leads to cooperation among buyers and sellers to
mitigate the effects of switching costs.
Contracts in which sellers precommit to prices
that compensate (at least partially) for start-up or
switching costs is one such form of cooperation.
For example, business loans and lines of credit are
often contractually tied to the prime lending rate,
the London Inter-Bank Offering Rate (LIBOR) or other
cost-of-funds indexes.  By tying loan rates to such
indexes, banks effectively precommit to prices that
are state dependent, where the state is the prevail-
ing index rate.  
Banks choose their own prime rates, however,
and banks jockey to be among the ﬁrst to adjust
their prime rates, yet wish to avoid false starts and
retractions that occur when other banks do not fol-
low their lead.  Imperfect competition rendered by
switching costs leads a bank to consider the trade-
off between enhancing its market share and monop-
oly pricing of its existing customer base when ad-
justing the prime rate.  Several authors, including
Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) and Klemperer
(1995), have observed that the business cycle can
affect this trade-off if ﬁrms prefer smooth proﬁt
streams.  In cyclical downturns, ﬁrms with market
power may smooth proﬁts by charging relatively
high prices, rather than seeking to expand market
share. Banks also must consider that if they were to
seek greater market share in a cyclical downturn,
they would face adverse selection: the prospect of
lending to businesses with the highest cyclical prob-
abilities of failure.  Thus, the prospect of adverse
selection serves as an additional source of proﬁt
volatility for banks across the business cycle.  For
these reasons, bank managers typically opt to main-
tain relatively high loan rates during cyclical down-
turns, rather than garner greater market share. If
bank managers generally behave this way, the prime
rate could display an asymmetric response to pro-
cyclical movements in short-term market interest
rates.  The next section discusses the empirical
model used for this investigation.
Dynamic Ordered Probit Model
At their inception, qualitative response models—
logits and probits—were designed for cross-sectional
data (Goldberger, 1964).  For probit models of a
cross section, a maintained assumption is that the
shock to each individual is an independent draw
from the population distribution.  Increasingly, how-
ever, qualitative response models are applied to time
series, where one realistically cannot assume inde-
pendence across observations.  Discrete changes in
the prime rate across time are one such example.
Most qualitative response models, however, do not
incorporate time-series features, such as treatment
of serial correlation and conditional heteroscedas-
ticity.  The chief obstacle to applying time-series
methods has been that the residuals are not readily
recovered in discrete choice models. 
A notable exception is the dynamic ordered
probit of Eichengreen, Watson, and Grossman (1985).
In this model, an observed variable, Y, changes eachperiod by one of J different discrete amounts, includ-
ing changes of zero.  The impetus for a change in
the prime rate does not appear suddenly in periods
when discrete changes take place, only to disappear
in periods when no change takes place.  Instead, the
dynamic probit uses a continuous measure of the
impetus for a prime rate change wherein a discrete
change takes place when the impetus reaches a crit-
ical level or threshold.  The impetus equals the differ-
ence between a continuous latent level and the lagged
value of the observed rate, Yt* 2 Yt21.  The latent
level is deﬁned in terms of its own changes from
period to period, plus an initial level, Y0*, where the
changes in the latent level are assumed to depend on a
vector of lagged explanatory variables, DX, which are
changes in the three-month Treasury bill rate, plus
a disturbance as in an ordinary regression model:
(1)                       
The impetus is denoted Zt and can be written as
the sum of the new pressure for a change and the
pressure carried from the past, 
(2)     
In this way, the dynamic probit model allows the
impetus for a change in the prime rate to build
across time periods.  The size of the discrete change
in the prime rate (including zero changes) depends
on how the impetus compares with a set of threshold
constants (c0,..,cj), which determine that the actual
change, DYt, is in category j if and only if
(3)     
For example, the range for the category of no change
in the prime rate might be the interval (-0.30, 0.25).
This hypothetical range indicates that the gap be-
tween the latent and lagged actual prime rates needed
to induce a change would have to be at least 30 basis
points for a decrease and 25 basis points for an in-
crease.  In this way, the threshold coefﬁcients can
imply a form of asymmetry in the behavior of the
prime rate.  
The maximum-likelihood estimation procedure
of Eichengreen, Watson, and Grossman (1985) for
the dynamic probit requires numerical evaluation
of an integral at each observation to obtain the
marginal likelihood of Yt* from the joint density of
Yt* and Yt* 21. In cases like the dynamic ordered
probit, where the likelihood function is difﬁcult to
evaluate, Dueker (1999) shows that Bayesian analy-
sis via a technique called Gibbs sampling offers a
tractable method to generate a sample of draws
from the marginal distribution of Yt* through a se-
quence of draws from the respective conditional dis-
tributions, f(Yt* | Yt* 21, Yt* 11).  The advantage is that
one conditions the density Yt* on a value, instead of
a density, of Yt* 21, making the problem much sim-
pler.  Further discussion of Gibbs sampling is in the
accompanying insert.
Additional Features of the Model
I include Markov switching in two parameters
to confront as many time-series properties of the
data as possible, particularly the large increase in
interest rate volatility that accompanied the Federal
Reserve’s use of nonborrowed reserves targets be-
tween 1979 and 1982. With Markov switching, Gibbs
sampling becomes the only way to estimate the
dynamic ordered probit model, because the maximum-
likelihood procedure would be intractable.  Markov
switching in the variance of the disturbance term,
et, allows for time variation in the variance and should
allow the model to capture the volatile 1979-82 regime.
A binary state variable, S1, governs the state switching
in the variance:
(4)
S1t is either 0 or 1.
I also make the intercept, b0, subject to Markov
switching governed by a second binary state vari-
able, S2, because b0, represents a rate of drift in Y*
since equation 1 is written in ﬁrst differences.
Hence, the model allows the drift parameter to
shift and even to change sign.  Small changes in
the probability that an interest rate will increase
next period can have a large impact on the prices
of interest rate options, for example, so careful esti-
mates of drift terms are important to some market
participants.  I also experimented with speciﬁca-
tions that included rYt* 21 on the right-hand side of
equation 1, to allow for mean reversion in the prime
rate, but the estimated values of r were always ex-
tremely close to zero.
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Conditional distributions for the Markov state
variables, S1 and S2, are included in the chain of
conditional distributions for the Gibbs sampler.
The conditional distributions for Markov state vari-
ables are found in Dueker (1999).  Also included in
the parameter chain is the vector of cut-off coefﬁ-
cients from equation 3.  These coefﬁcients have
conditional distributions (conditional on drawn
values of Z) where cj distributed is uniformly on 
the interval bounded below by cj21 and above by
the smallest Z which is in category j11.  These
threshold bounds ensure that cj21 ,Zt , cj for all
drawn values of Z.
Because it is impossible to identify simultane-
ously the magnitudes of the cut-off coefﬁcients
and the variances of the disturbance term, s2
S1t
, I
ﬁxed the variances at 0.01 and 0.10, respec-
tively, for S1 5 0 and S1 5 1. This choice, in principle,
allows for a tenfold shift in the variance during the
Federal Reserve’s period of targeting non-borrowed
reserves from 1979 to 1982.  In practice, the variance
will not have to shift that much because the Treasury
bill rate as an explanatory variable induces much of
the increased volatility experienced by the prime
rate.  The results are robust, however, to changes in
the variance levels that move them closer together,
provided that the unconditional variance remains
roughly the same.
Data and Estimation Results
Changes in the week-ending prime rate from
January 4, 1975, to October 15, 1999, fall into
S S q t t 2 1 2 1 1 2 = = ( ) = - .
S S p t t 2 0 2 0 1 2 = = ( ) = -
S S q t t 1 1 1 1 1 1 = = ( ) = -
S S p t t 1 0 1 0 1 1 = = ( ) = -
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In empirical estimation, it is common to en-
counter cases where one does not know how, or
ﬁnds it cumbersome, to evaluate a probability den-
sity function or other population characteristic of a
random variable of interest. For Bayesian estimation,
the random variables of interest are the model para-
meters, such as slope coefﬁcients (b from equa-
tion 1).  We would like to make Bayesian infer-
ences concerning the posterior distribution of b
conditional on the observed data, YT, from the
entire sample period.  Such inferences would be
very difﬁcult to derive directly.  
In this case, however, a conditional distribution
for b is known, conditional on the latent desired
levels, Y T *. With the Gibbs sampler, we can generate
samples from f(b | YT) using the Gibbs sampler,
without ever evaluating f(b | YT) directly (Casella
and George, 1992).
The Gibbs sampler consists of a chain of
draws from conditional distributions:
,
where superscript i indicates iteration number i
through the Gibbs sampler.  That is, we draw values
of b from a distribution we know (conditional on
YT *), and we then use those values of b to draw new
values of YT *. The key idea behind Gibbs sampling
is that after a sufﬁcient number of iterations of
drawing new values of b and YT * in this way, the
draws represent draws from the respective marginal
densities, conditional only on YT, even though the
marginal densities often cannot be evaluated directly
(Gelfand and Smith, 1990).  As outlined in Dueker
(1999), Gibbs sampling is an attractive approach
for the dynamic ordered probit, because it is rela-
tively easy to sample from appropriate conditional
distributions.  For b conditional on YT *, the most
intuitive choice for the conditional distribution is
multivariate normal with the mean and variance
of the ordinary least squares estimator from equa-
tion 1.  For YT *, the vector of latent variables, the
implied conditional distribution is truncated normal.
Details concerning the conditional means and
variances of the elements of YT * are in Dueker (1999).
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seven categories with the relative frequencies shown
in Table 1.  The prime rate changed in about 17 per-
cent of all weeks.  I test the prime rate for asym-
metric movements relative to the three-month
Treasury bill rate, a benchmark short-term market
interest rate.  Figure 1 illustrates the procyclical
swings in the T-bill rate and the prime rate.  At this
point, it is important to note that since April 1994,
the prime rate has moved in tandem with the target
federal funds rate and has been equal to the target
funds rate plus 3 percent.  In part, this close con-
nection between the prime rate and the target
federal funds rate owes to the practice adopted in
February 1994 whereby the Federal Open Market
Committee, the monetary policy body of the Federal
Reserve, announces changes in the target federal
funds rate at the conclusion of its meetings.  Because
of this regime change, which has resulted in close
ties between the prime rate and the target federal
funds rate, I present separate estimates for a data
set that stops in April 1994 and another that con-
tinues until October 1999.1
Because adjustment of the prime rate to market
developments may take a few weeks, we are interested
primarily in tracking the cumulative response of
the prime rate to changes in the market interest
rate.  One manifestation of asymmetry would take
the form of a faster response of the prime rate to
increases than decreases in the T-bill rate.  Accord-
ingly, coefﬁcients representing sums of lag coefﬁ-
cients are presented.  Thus, if the original model
were written with Gs denoting coefﬁcients on indi-
vidual lags of the regressor variable:
then the reported b coefﬁcients are deﬁned as
The lag length, k, was chosen based on when the b
coefﬁcients lost signiﬁcance, which is at lag eight
for changes in the T-bill rate.  The T-bill changes are
all lagged at least one period, so they are predeter-
mined relative to this week’s change in the depen-
dent variable.  I partition the T-bill changes into
increases and decreases to test for asymmetric
response of the latent prime rate, Y*.
I also test for symmetry in the threshold coefﬁ-
cients.  Equation 5 shows that symmetry would
imply that c1 5 2 c6, c2 5 2 c5, and c3 5 2 c4.
Since Zt5 Yt* 2 Yt21 measures the misalignment
of the prime rate relative to the latent level, these
restrictions on the threshold coefﬁcients would
imply that the necessary degrees of misalignment
b b b 1 1 2 2 = + + ( ) = + + ( ) = G G G G G ... , ... ,..., . k k k k
G G G 1 1 2 2 X X X t t k t k - - - + + + ... ,
Observation Categories Based on
Size of Prime Rate Change.
Sample period: 1/3/75 – 10/15/99
Category Criterion Frequency
1 DPrime , 2 .50 1112
2 DPrime 5 2 .50 1144
3 DPrime 5 2 .25 1141
4 DPrime 5 0 1105
5 DPrime 5 1 .25 1145
6 DPrime 5 1 .50 1133
7 DPrime . 1 .50 1115
Table 1
Figure 1











1 If one were seeking to maximize a measure of ﬁt for prime-rate
changes, the target federal funds rate and/or the discount rate would
be strong explanatory variables.  Here, however, the objective is to
examine how the prime rate moves relative to a benchmark short-
term interest rate, the three-month T-bill rate.38 SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2000
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t o bring about increases and decreases in the
prime rate are equal to each other:
(5)
The estimation results in Table 2 represent a run
of the Gibbs sampler of 8,000 iterations, where the
last 5,000 were saved to calculate posterior moments
after the sampler had converged.  Table 2 presents
two sets of results, with and without the 1994-99
period.  The results in Dueker (1999) showed that
inclusion of Markov switching in the variance was
necessary for a model of prime-rate changes to
pass a chi-square goodness-of-ﬁt test.  The model
presented here easily passes the same test with
probability values of 0.50 for the 1975-99 period
and 0.51 for the 1975-94 period.  Therefore, I pre-
sent the tests for asymmetry based on this speciﬁ-
cation of the model.
The estimated b coefﬁcients in Table 2 show
evidence of asymmetry in the form of sluggish
downward response to decreases in the T-bill rate.
As one would expect, the overall response (b1) is
not signiﬁcantly different from one, for either in-
creases or decreases.  This means that the prime
rate and the T-bill rates do not wander apart from
each other in the long run.  Moreover, it does not
take long for the latent prime rate, Y*, to make a
one-to-one adjustment to a change in the T-bill
rate—about eight weeks for decreases according
to the estimates in Table 2.  
For increases, on the other hand, the adjust-
ment is even faster, as the lag coefﬁcients beyond
three weeks are not jointly signiﬁcant (b4).  Thus, the
latent prime rate, Y*, makes a one-to-one adjustment
with the T-bill rate within three weeks when rates
are increasing, but does not make the same adjust-
ment until eight weeks have elapsed when rates are
decreasing. The probability value of the Wald test
for equal b coefﬁcients at all eight lags easily rejects
in favor of the hypothesis that the prime rate takes
longer to make a full adjustment to a decrease than
an increase in the T-bill rate.  Thus, a statistically sig-
niﬁcant asymmetry exists in the slope coefﬁcients
between increases and decreases; by itself, however,
it is not of great economic importance whether full
adjustment to the latent prime takes place in eight
weeks or three weeks.  For this reason, we also
examine the contribution of the threshold coefﬁ-
cients to asymmetry in the prime rate.  
Table 2 also contains estimates of the threshold
coefﬁcients, which can serve as additional source
of asymmetry if we can reject c3 5 2 c4, c2 5 2 c5,
and c1 5 2 c6.  These threshold coefﬁcients measure
the impetus for a change in the prime that is needed
to induce a discrete change. The two sets of results
in Table 2 both show that the threshold coefﬁcients
are asymmetric between increases and decreases.
The impetus Zt5 Yt* 2 Yt21 needed to change in
the prime rate is substantially larger for a decrease
of any size than for a corresponding increase.  For
a 25 basis-point decrease, the impetus must be
greater than 90 basis points (c3) according to the
1975-99 estimates vs. 44 basis points for a 25
basis-point increase in the prime.  The fact that
both c3 and c4 are greater than the 25 basis-point
change that they demarcate demonstrates that the
prime rate is fairly rigid.  Across all three size cate-
gories, the magnitude of the asymmetry is between
40 and 50 basis points, and we can easily reject
c3 5 2 c4, c2 5 2 c5, and c1 5 2 c6 at the 95-percent
conﬁdence level. For the data sample that ends in
April 1994, the magnitude of the asymmetry is
somewhat less, between 30 and 35 basis points,
but is still highly statistically signiﬁcant.  
For either sample period, the impetus needed
to induce a decrease in the prime rate is large
enough to lift the average level of the prime rate
relative to the mean of the latent prime, Y*.  The
difference in their means is 25 basis points, with
the average difference even greater in periods of
falling interest rates.   Figure 2 plots the latent
prime Y* and actual prime Y for roughly the last
400 weeks in the sample, which include periods of
rising and falling interest rates.   The ﬁgure shows
that, during periods of rising interest rates, the actual
prime rate does not have a mean appreciably differ-
ent from that of the latent prime.  Because of asym-
metries in the threshold coefﬁcients, however, the
prime lags behind the latent prime when the two
rates are falling.  This asymmetry in the threshold
coefﬁcients leads to the gaps between the latent
prime Y*and actual prime Y shown in Figure 2
during periods of falling interest rates.
DY Z c t t > + « > . . 50 6
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In sum, we ﬁnd evidence of  two types of asym-
metry in the prime rate.  First, the latent prime rate
moves more quickly in relation to the T-bill rate if
the two rates are rising than if they are falling, but
this time lag by itself is not likely to be of economic
importance.  Second, the threshold coefﬁcients
indicate that a larger impetus is required to lower
the prime rate than to raise it.  But at the same
time, the thresholds imply that the prime rate will
respond to sufﬁciently large gaps between the latent
prime and the actual prime, so the gap cannot be-
come arbitrarily large.  Once a threshold is reached,
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of ST. LOUIS
Posterior Distributions of Parameters
1975-99 1975-94
Parameter Post. mean 95% interval Post. mean 95% interval
Coefﬁcients for changes in T-bill rate
INC for increases: DEC for decreases
b1 INC 1.09 (.912,1.26) 1.09 (.911,1.26)
b1 DEC 1.11 (.971,1.26) 1.12 (.966,1.26)
b2 INC .447 (.205,.695) .434 (.145,.677)
b2 DEC .613 (.437,.790) .616 (.436,.798)
b3 INC .327 (.099,.562) .335 (.097,.571)
b3 DEC .492 (.310,.670) .489 (.298,.662)
b4 INC 2.020 (2.261,.236) 20.46 (2.304,.196)
b4 DEC .408 (.223,.596) .413 (.210,.618)
b5 INC 2.041 (2.264,.189) 2.062 (2.283,.166)
b5 DEC .350 (.159,.539) .355 (.163,.563)
b6 INC .010 (2.198,.226) 2.011 (2.220,.199)
b6 DEC .239 (.061,.413) .244 (.056,.428)
b7 INC 2.021 (2.211,.173) 2.051 (2.244,.133)
b7 DEC .182 (.031,.346) .213 (.034,.398)
b8 INC .044 (2.124,.221) .037 (2.139,.200)
b8 DEC .219 (.067,.368) .242 (.074,.403)
Cut-off coefﬁcients
c1 21.44 (21.64,21.26) 21.35 (21.55,21.21)
c2 21.05 (21.22,2.926) 2.950 (21.08,2.881)
c3 2.929 (21.09,2.812) 2.840 (2.963,2.773)
c4 1.441 (.321,.571) 1.492 (.433,.559)
c5 1.583 (.454,.712) 1.647 (.583,.712)
c6 1.923 (.719,1.17) 11.02 (.876,1.20)
c3 1 c4 2.487 (2.760,2.252) 2.348 (2.505,2.264)
c2 1 c5 2.467 (2.737,2.226) 2.304 (2.454,2.207)
c1 1 c6 2.514 (2.867,2.156) 2.324 (2.569,2.105)
Markov switching drift coefﬁcients
b0 (S2 5 0) 2.009 (2.037,.014) 2.010 (2.042,.016)
b0 (S2 5 1) .015 (2.008,.043) .018 (2.008,.052)
Table 240 SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2000
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the prime will change to begin to close the gap.  A
gap can persist following a series of interest rate cuts,
however, until interest rates turn upward, as shown
in Figure 2.                 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This article attempts to move from anecdotal
evidence about asymmetric behavior of bank loan
rates to speciﬁc econometric tests. I use these tests
to address the arguments that asymmetry in bank-
administered interest rates implies that asymmetry
renders borrowers more vulnerable to business cycle
downturns than they otherwise would be and that
monetary policy easings have less effect than mon-
etary policy tightenings.  Within the asymmetric
bounds implied by the threshold coefﬁcients, both
of these arguments appear to hold, but it is impor-
tant to note the limited scope of the asymmetry,
which does not permit the prime to remain too far
above where it would be in the absence of asym-
metry. Similarly, it is perhaps too easy to jump to
the conclusion that, other things being equal, bor-
rowers would beneﬁt if the asymmetry were not
present.  The asymmetry is probably the market’s
response to the rise in default and late payment prob-
abilities of borrowers that occurs during cyclical
downturns.  Hence, fewer funds would be loaned in
the absence of asymmetry, so it is not possible to
remove the asymmetry and keep other things equal. 
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